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SOCIOTECHNICAL MODEL  
OF SHIP ORGANIZATION EFFECTIVENESS
ABSTRACT
This article investigates the possibility of optimizing the 
organization of a ship as a highly complex technical system. 
In this sense, the existing relationship between technology 
and the human as a user is considered. Using the socio-
technical approach the aim is to identify the weaknesses in 
the existing technological and organizational ship’s system. 
Based on research conducted on the navigation simulator, 
socio-technical components that affect the safety of naviga-
tion have been observed. By subsequent comparative analy-
ses of the implementation of technical solutions in accor-
dance with the human requirements certain solutions are 
proposed and conclusions made.
KEY WORDS
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1. INTRODUCTION
The crew of a ship is gradually but continually put 
in the position of dependence by the advantages of 
advanced technology solutions at management level. 
The knowledge and the feeling that technical systems 
may fail are increasingly suppressed. Uncritical ac-
ceptance of information provided by such systems in 
terms of automation, information technology and self-
control of the working conditions leads to indulgence 
in technical and technological solutions. At a time 
when uncritical submission to and compliance with 
technology lead to dependence on technology, which 
means that our working knowledge and skills are no 
longer fundamental factors in making and implement-
ing decisions, then we speak about the phenomenon 
of technology complacency and technology as a form 
of uncritical indulgence in technological solutions. This 
is also an asynchrony which leads to the fall of orga-
nizational effectiveness in terms of human resources 
and safety of navigation.
An example of such a phenomenon in maritime ac-
cidents was the Titanic whose master, due to the gen-
eral belief in the ship’s inability to sink, came himself 
under the influence of the superiority of the vessel and, 
among other things for this reason he suppressed his 
acquired knowledge, experience and caution.
That such attitudes are still present and even more 
dangerous due to possible impacts on the environment 
has been confirmed by the case of the collision of the 
passenger ship Norwegian Dream and the container 
ship Ever Decent. Until the last moment, the officer of 
the Norwegian Dream relied on the radar information 
that was not properly selected considering the condi-
tions. The same element of wrong interpretation of the 
radar image and reliance on ARPA (Automatic Radar 
Plotting Aid) has been noted in the event of a collision 
of cargo ships Pyotr Vasev and Admiral Nakhimov, 
where the master of Vasev himself came under the in-
fluence of the so-called “radar hypnosis” and neglect-
ed all other sources of information, including his active 
knowledge and experience of visual observation.
Thus, uncritical acceptance of technology as an ob-
served form of dangerous conduct expressed through 
the phenomenon of complacency is a current socio-
technical process that accompanies the constant ten-
dency towards automation of technological processes 
applied to the ship´s control.
2.  SOCIO-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
WORK ENVIRONMENT ON THE 
PASSIVIZATION OF ACTIVE KNOWLEDGE
In scientific literature the notion of socio-technics 
is commonly encountered. In addition, the terms such 
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as socio-technical theory, socio-technical systems and 
theories of socio-technical systems commonly appear. 
But regardless of the term the basic purpose of the 
concept of socio-technics is proposing numerous and 
different ways to achieve optimal unity of human and 
technical resources. In this sense the term is often 
used to simplify and appropriately describe any type 
of organization consisting of people and technology. 
Socio-technical theory suggests that the human fac-
tor and social institutions form an integrated system, 
and that the attainment of organizational goals is 
not achieved by optimizing the technical elements, 
but by the joint optimization of social and technical 
resources (Trist & Bamforth, 1951:39)1. As the ship 
organization is composed of people in close relation 
with the ship´s technical systems and as interactivity 
of human and technical system is the basis of navi-
gation safety, the notion of socio-technics can be ap-
plied in the full sense in the analysis of organizational 
and work processes. The socio-technical theory pays 
special attention to the internal control of organization 
and leadership at the level of “group” and refers to 
“responsible autonomy” of the team (ibid.). The key to 
“responsible autonomy” is in the organizational struc-
ture which basically should consist of small groups or 
teams responsible for their own internal organization 
and control with the primary task of establishing re-
lationships with other groups, which is the explicit re-
sponsibility of group leaders (Rice, 1958: 246)2. This 
principle, among other things, describes the strategy 
of removing the traditional hierarchical management 
which is still a burden to modern ship´s organizations. 
Given the complexity of the ship as a technical system, 
only small groups of independent specialists – teams, 
can achieve effective interactivity between the mana-
gerial elements of ship´s organization and technology 
that the ship has at its disposal. Accordingly, the socio-
technical approach seeks to achieve optimal interrela-
tion between social and technical aspects within the 
organization and is based on two basic principles:
 – Interaction of human and technical factors which, 
depending on the degree of compliance, create 
conditions for efficient or inefficient organization. 
This interaction can be linear as “cause-effect” one 
(which is an ordinary anticipated relationship) and 
partly non-linear, complex and thus can take a form 
of unpredictable relationships (good or bad, but 
always unexpected). Whether predictable or not, 
both interactive relationships occur when socio-
technical elements are put into operation.
 – Consequently, the second principle is that opti-
mization of each element individually (human or 
technical), independently of one another, tends to 
increase not only the possibility of unpredictable 
and unusual relationships, but rather such rela-
tionships lead to a drop in the efficiency of organi-
zational system as a whole.
Applying the principles of socio-technical systems 
to the modern ship’s organizational structure we come 
to the following facts:
According to the first principle the crew should be 
in compliance with the technical and technological as-
pects of the ship managed. However, this is often not 
the case due to the lack of usage standards applied 
to the equipment used for similar purposes, regard-
less of whether this refers to a part of the navigational, 
propulsion or other ship´s technical subsystem. The 
dominant share of human error in maritime accidents 
(75-96%) is basically not only the result of operator’s 
error. Many of the mistakes that were made and that 
led to accidents arose from non-compliance of the 
ship´s technology and the ship´s crew members as 
users.
Non-standardized and, thus, often poorly designed 
equipment is cited as a causal factor in 1/3 of the ma-
jor maritime accidents (Wagenaar, 1987:587)3. From 
the standpoint of the first socio-technical principle the 
improvement of the safety and effectiveness of con-
ducting a vessel as well as better usability from the 
viewpoint of equipment handling are not the primary 
targets. The primary goal is the systematic integration 
of four basic elements that in correlation form the hu-
man-ship relationship (Schuffel, 1981:7)4. These ele-
ments are:
 – program (processes, rules, regulations);
 – program holders (process dynamics, control sys-
tems, indicators);
 – work environment (work climate, vibrations, noise);
 – human labour functions (motivation, stress, skills).
Based on these four elements the following sys-
tems and relationships should be formed and known 
in advance:
 – control systems,
 – human-machine relationship.
Proper implementation of these systems and re-
lationships can be achieved by effective organization 
of the ship by the first socio-technical principle. Look-
ing at the organizational structure of the ship from 
the aspect of the second principle the mismatch in 
the co-evolution of human and technical elements is 
also visible. Namely, the element of the ship´s techni-
cal development is strongly emphasized, which simul-
taneously is not an integral part of developing mari-
time organization in terms of human resources. The 
relationship between human and technical system has 
historical continuity with the transfer of work load from 
human onto the machine. This attitude is illustrated 
by Döring: “Man has the ability to predict or cognitive 
capabilities that allow him to see what he wants or ex-
pects to see, while the machine cannot have these fea-
tures.” Or “Man has the ability to foresee or cognitive 
abilities enabling him to see what he wants or expects 
to see whereas machine cannot have these abilities”. 
“Man can recognize and use the relevant information 
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from a multitude of details or examples in the real 
world with the aim of simplifying complex situations, 
while the machine has limited perceptual constant”. 
(Döring, 1976:12)5 Accordingly, a clear distinction 
should be made of the automation of the processes 
which by their nature can help and support humans 
from those processes which passivize and reduce hu-
man concentration and efficiency in priority decision-
making and selective acting. Given the marked de-
velopment of technology that seeks to substitute the 
current human activity this leads to passivization of 
the traditional seafarers’ knowledge as certain devic-
es have taken over certain components of seafarers’ 
active knowledge and skills. Because of the disparity 
in the dynamics of human and technical resources the 
ship’s organization shows a certain inefficiency ac-
cording to the second socio-technical principle which 
is reflected on the safety of exploitation of the ship as 
a technical system. Previous socio-technical consider-
ations of ship’s organizational-technological problems 
can be summarized as a schematic diagram of the so-
cio-technical strategy (STS), which can be the basis for 
the formation of the system of parallel development of 
technical and social resources (Figure 1).
Producing design solutions; The active involvement 
of users and a clear understanding of user and task 
requirements; An appropriate allocation of function 
between users and technology; Iteration of design so-
lutions.”
Starting from these principles, ships as socio-tech-
nical systems have to be organized in such a manner 
that risks arising from mismatch between seafarers, 
their ship, its systems and operational procedures are 
mitigated.
3. INVESTIGATION OF THE PHENOMENON 
OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL MISMATCH 
AND TECHNOLOGY INDULGENCE
In order to prove the actual presence of the phe-
nomenon of socio-technical mismatch and technology 
indulgence onboard modern ships, the following inves-
tigation was carried out on the navigation subsystem 
simulator.
The phenomenon of the impact of technology on 
passivization of active knowledge and skills from the 
aspect of navigation can be studied on modern navi-
gation subsystems simulator that allow the simulation 
of real conditions of navigation and watch-keeping on 
the bridge. Such a possibility was realized in the North 
Control navigation subsystem simulator at the Faculty 
of Maritime Studies in Split.
With the visualization of the movement of the ship 
in a constant range of 220° the simulator includes re-
alistic elements of the navigating bridge modern equip-
ment which includes two ARPA navigation radars, GPS 
(Global Positioning System), electronic chart, Doppler 
speed log and echo sounder, engine telegraph and 
engine condition indicators, the internal and external 
communication instruments, GMDSS (Global Maritime 
Distress Safety System) and VHF (Very High Frequency) 
equipment as well as steering gear with the correspond-
ing elements of automatic steering and rudder deflec-
tion controls. In the simulator there is a chart table with 
the traditional nautical charts, and all the supporting 
equipment for navigation and passage planning. In 
addition to these essential elements the simulator in-
cludes other additional devices for determining wind 
speed and direction, monitoring rate of turn, etc.
The study of the phenomenon mentioned in the 
simulated sailing conditions aims at comparing the ra-
tio of knowledge and skills in determining the ship´s 
position and the application of automation positioning 
systems. The investigation was carried out in the field 
of determination of the position and conduct of navi-
gation using terrestrial method of radar positioning as 
elements of active application of knowledge and skills, 
as well as the use of GPS and electronic charts and 
automated positioning devices that potentially passiv-
ize the skills mentioned.






Figure 1 - Schematic model of socio-technical principles
Source  According to MIS Problems and Failures:
A Socio-technical Perspective. Bostrom, R. P., Heinen, J. S.,
MIS Quarterly, Vol. 1 Issue 3, September 1977
:
6
Figure 1 shows the connection between social and 
technical systems which leads to better usability in the 
maritime industry. Furthermore, through the shown 
schematic model we can emphasize efficiency, effec-
tiveness and satisfaction of users performing tasks 
with the system in a defined context of the socio-tech-
nical principles. This aspect is illustrated by Rasmus-
sen (2005: 3): “Masters and crew want a ship that 
is easy to operate, comfortable and also safe, in the 
broadest sense of the word, and certainly with respect 
to the work environment.” Earthy (2005: 2) defined 
usability through human-centred design which entails 
following socio-technical activities and principles:
“Understanding and specifying the context of use; 
Specifying the user and organizational requirements; 
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The study was conducted on 28 professional sea-
farers divided into seven groups of four. Each group 
represented a separate crew whose members had 
never met previously and that was expected to carry 
out the same task of simulated voyage as all the other 
groups. Within each group the seafarers were selected 
according to the positions they hold in real life, i.e. the 
master, first, second and third officers. A helmsman 
was then assigned to each group, who was supposed 
to carry out only the duty of the helmsman and as such 
was not the subject of investigation. The master was 
free to coordinate the first, second and third officers 
according to his assessment of the situation and per-
sonal experience. Terms of simulation were as follows:
Bulk cargo ship of 60,000 dwt with a draft of 10m 
and a length overall of 210m was anchored at 2.5M 
northeast of the French port of Boulogne. The seafar-
ers were given order by the company to leave the an-
chorage according to the traffic separation scheme for 
the English Channel, join the scheme and proceed to 
the North-West towards the Dutch port of Rotterdam. 
Navigation conditions were good with a visibility of 
10M and sea state 3. The ship was supposed to leave 
the anchorage at 14:00 hours local time during day-
light. All navigation aids on the bridge were prepared 
including radars. Engine room was given the order 
“Stand-by engine room”.
The investigation began with the first group on 
March 16, 2008 at 10:00 hours. While weighing an-
chor the master requested from the second officer to 
check the position and plot it on the nautical chart. 
The second officer first visually checked the position 
on the electronic chart, and then took the coordinates 
from the GPS device, and plotted them on the chart. 
The master tacitly accepted such an act and on the ba-
sis of insight into the position on the chart he ordered 
the course of leaving the anchorage. Some twenty 
minutes after leaving the anchorage and entering the 
traffic separation scheme the master was relieved by 
the first officer who also continued with plotting posi-
tion on the chart based on data obtained from the GPS 
device. Plotting position on the chart was formal, while 
in reality the first officer during the voyage oriented on 
the basis of electronic chart and radar image which 
was used to determine the true and relative motion 
of nearby ships. At 10:30 hours the investigation was 
discontinued.
At 11:00 hours, after getting acquainted with the 
navigation equipment the second group began work 
in the same conditions as the previous group. When 
asked by the master about the position of the ship, the 
second officer used the GPS device as the reference 
data on position. The estimated point of the ship’s turn 
onto the new course was stored as WP (waypoint) in 
the GPS device and electronic chart. Also, the move-
ment of the ship towards the waypoint was visually 
monitored on the electronic chart and radar without 
plotting position on the nautical chart. On arrival at the 
point of ship’s turn the master ordered the turn onto 
the new course after which the voyage continued in 
the traffic separation scheme to the port of destina-
tion. All the time the nautical chart was formally used 
for the determination of the course fixed on the basis 
of data from the electronic chart and GPS device. At 
23:40 hours the simulation was completed.
At 12:10 the third group, after getting acquainted 
with the instruments of the bridge, began setting sail. 
The master requested the second officers to check 
the position. He specifically requested radar position-
ing and comparing the position obtained with the GPS 
position. After the comparison which showed minimal 
deviation both in the case of radar and the GPS posi-
tion the master demanded from the second officer de-
termination of position during setting sail and joining 
the traffic separation scheme only by radar positioning 
and the use of nautical charts. After turning onto the 
new course and proceeding towards the port of desti-
nation the position was determined by simultaneous 
use of radar and GPS, so the movement of the ship 
and its position on the nautical chart was compared 
with the position and movement of the ship on the 
electronic chart. At 12:45 hours the simulation was 
terminated.
After completion of practical preparations the 
fourth group started the manoeuvre of leaving the an-
chorage at 13:05. Previously, the master requested 
plotting the point of turn and joining the traffic separa-
tion scheme on the nautical chart as well as storing 
coordinates into the GPS device and electronic chart. 
The master took over the role of general control and 
issuing orders. After storing the coordinates into the 
GPS device and electronic chart leaving anchorage 
began on the basis of the position obtained from the 
GPS device. Until reaching the point of turning and en-
tering the traffic separation scheme the position was 
checked by controlling the movements on the electron-
ic chart and the GPS device which continued after the 
turn onto the course towards the port of Rotterdam. 
The simulation ended at 13:40 hours.
The fifth group began simulation on March 17, 
2008 at 09:30 a.m. The master ordered the point of 
turn for entry into the traffic separation scheme on the 
nautical chart and requested from the second officer 
the storing of the coordinates into the GPS device, as 
reference points for altering course. Departure coordi-
nates of setting sail were obtained from the GPS, and 
navigation towards the traffic separation scheme was 
followed on the electronic chart. During joining the 
traffic separation scheme and turning onto the course 
towards the port of Rotterdam the position was deter-
mined by the GPS device. Nautical chart was used only 
for formal plotting the departing position and that of 
turning onto the course towards the port of destination 
by the GPS coordinates. Navigation on the course to-
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wards the port of Rotterdam was controlled using the 
electronic chart and the GPS device. The simulation 
was completed at 22:20 hours.
The sixth group, after initial familiarization with 
the instruments, began sailing at 11:15 hours on the 
same day as the previous group. Although the second 
officer wanted to fix the position with the GPS device 
the master demanded radar position with two bear-
ings. After the position was plotted on the chart the 
master requested plotting of the planned position of 
the ship’s turn onto the new course in the traffic sepa-
ration scheme on the starboard radar. In the course 
of navigation the second officer checked the position 
by radar and plotted it on the chart, so the master cor-
rected the ship’s course using this information. The 
master occasionally compared the course of the ship 
with the electronic chart, but he conducted the ship 
on the basis of radar positioning. After joining the traf-
fic separation scheme and turning onto the course to-
wards the port of Rotterdam the position was checked 
by parallel use of radar positioning and GPS coordi-
nates. At 12:00 hours the simulation was completed.
At 12:30 the seventh group began with heaving 
the anchor. During this time the position was obtained 
from the GPS device, and the coordinates were plotted 
on the nautical chart. The position of the ship’s turn 
in the traffic separation scheme was also stored into 
the GPS device as a reference point. On the nautical 
chart only two positions were plotted and they were 
both obtained from the GPS device. Joining the traf-
fic separation scheme and turn onto the new course 
were followed on the electronic chart. On the nauti-
cal chart the GPS position was plotted as the position 
from which the course within the traffic separation 
scheme towards the port of Rotterdam was plotted. 
In the subsequent part of the simulation navigation 
was conducted with position checking exclusively by 
automatic, i.e. GPS positioning and visual checking of 
the electronic chart. In the course of navigation on the 
new course the position was plotted every 15 minutes 
on the nautical chart on the basis of GPS coordinates.
Investigation results
Looking at the work and actions of respondents in 
terms of influence of technology on passivization of 
knowledge and skills, and uncritical adoption of auto-
matically obtained information on the ship’s position, 
the following has been noted:
The first, second, fourth, fifth and seventh group 
of respondents chose the GPS position as a reliable 
and accurate position of the ship, and during setting 
sail and navigation they also used the electronic chart. 
With respect to such a choice, the decisions and ac-
tions were based on the automatic positioning sys-
tems and navigation control. Thus, decisions about 
altering the speed and course of the ship were based 
on the automatically obtained data without checking 
them by the direct method of terrestrial or radar po-
sitioning of the objects on shore. Nautical chart was 
used to plot the coordinates from the GPS device, and 
on the basis of this information the course of leaving 
the anchorage was determined as well as the access 
to the traffic separation scheme, and eventually the 
course towards the port of Rotterdam. Within different 
groups there were no individual differences of opinion 
regarding the application of GPS as the primary means 
of ship positioning.
Unlike the previously mentioned groups, the third 
and the sixth group did not use automatic position-
ing to determine the course and speed of the ship. 
The method of terrestrial positioning by radar with 
two bearings was used for positioning on the nautical 
chart during leaving the anchorage, altering course 
and sailing in the traffic separation scheme. Thus, on 
the basis of the position obtained in this way, the deci-
sions about altering course and speed of the ship were 
made. In both cases the position was compared with 
the electronic means of positioning, but only as an al-
ternative source of information. However, the master 
of the third group explicitly required the use of radar 
as the primary means for positioning before the other 
crew members showed initiative in the choice of meth-
od for determining the position of the ship. With group 
six the second officer intended to use GPS positioning, 
but the master required radar positioning, and in the 
course of navigation the method of terrestrial radar po-
sitioning was consistently used.
The research clearly indicates the major phenome-
non of technology indulgence which can be seen from 
the actions of the respondents in group one, two, four, 
five and seven.
Groups three and six did not surrender to the temp-
tation of technology indulgence. However, the attempt 
by the second officer in group six to use GPS as the 
primary means of positioning is nevertheless signifi-
cant, although the action was prevented by the mas-
ter’s intervention. In the third group the master was 
explicit regarding the selection of the method of ship’s 
positioning.
This sequence of events points to another phe-
nomenon that has not been directly studied. This 
phenomenon is uncritical leadership style, i.e. lead-
ership indulgence. However, even here we can apply 
the elements of the socio-technical theory in terms of 
organization of human resources and work processes. 
According to Trist and Bamforth, the socio-technical 
theory pays special attention to leadership at group 
level and points to the team’s responsible autonomy, 
while according to Rice smaller groups or teams are 
responsible for their internal organization and con-
trol based on individual initiative. In this sense, there 
has been a lack of teamwork. Looking at the overall 
operation of the crew in each group the presence of 
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hierarchical authority of the master is notable. It is ex-
actly the influence of the master in group three and 
six which was the decisive factor of crewmembers’ ac-
tions. While from the aspect of technology indulgence 
we can talk about a positive influence, we should not 
ignore the possibility that in the master’s absence the 
individuals can nevertheless act differently, as was the 
intention of the second officer in group six. However, 
since the aim of the research was to determine the 
objective attitudes of the respondents at management 
level, it was necessary to divide them into groups ac-
cording to the same duties they perform in real life. 
Consequently, there is no doubt that the respondents 
as crewmembers onboard real ships would act in ac-
cordance with the results of the investigation.
Thus, five of the seven groups of respondents acted 
under the influence of technology. Out of 28 respon-
dents 20 of them from group one, two, four, five and 
seven plus one respondent from group six showed the 
tendency toward passivizing their active knowledge 
in favour of the technological solutions offered. This 
makes a total of 21 seafarers out of the total number 
of 28, or 75% of respondents which proves significant 
indulgence in technological solutions at the expense 
of active knowledge and skills as shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 2.
Table 1 - Ratio of radar and automatic positioning
Group
Respondents  
who chose  
radar positioning
Respondents  










4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
USE OF TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 
AND HUMAN RESOURCES FROM 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL ASPECT
Control systems, especially manual controls, are 
based on four basic socio-technical elements: usability 
adapted to human, conversion of information, storing 
of information and management. All these elements 
can be improved by mechanical and / or electronic 
means.
Normally, we talk about three levels of control: 
compensatory, open and feedback (Figure 3). At the 
compensation level the difference between the actual 
and the desired state of the value controlled is lim-
ited. Control performance at this level does not con-
tain information from which the operator could make a 
comparison of actual and desired state. Open control 
is oriented towards identifying the desired control ac-
tions, and their programming. Control of feedback al-
lows that on the basis of the data input the operator 























Figure 3 - Control systems
Source: Schuffel, H., Some Aspects of the Future Role of
Ergonomics in Ship Control, 1981, p. 9
The possibility to notice or assume information on 
the goal differs from the possibility of controlling the 
process dynamics. In other words, this means that at 
the compensatory level of control the only useful in-
formation available as an actual result of the process 
is a deviation which can be minimized in relation to 
the goal. With the open control, information is used 
to initiate pre-programme control level after which the 
sequence of processes takes place irrespective of the 
result, i.e. the goal required.
Feedback control can be viewed at the level of the 
previous two combined. Taking into account the input 
information in relation to the desired result, the opera-
tor can predict when the result will become visible, and 
can draw conclusions about the progress on the basis 
of the process parameters such as speed or previously 
remembered information about the movement. Pro-
cess values obtained at the output act as a function 
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of input process values. The ability to predict output 
values of the process is a function of human knowl-
edge, and it is also an active way of controlling the 
actual process parameters. From the socio-technical 
point of view the application of feedback control alone 
can satisfy the first socio-technical principle because it 
provides an opportunity for synchronized action in the 
human-technical system relationship.
Along with the development of engine automation 
there has been a development of automation on the 
navigating bridge where, for example, helmsman has 
been retained for safety reasons, tradition and unre-
liability of the instruments. Taking into account the 
development of automation on the bridge and in the 
engine room a comparison can be made of the levels 
at which automation took over some human functions 
of active control and work (usability, conversion, stor-
age, management). The comparison will be presented 
at three levels of control: compensatory, open and 
feedback.
Figure 5 represents a qualitative comparison of 
automated systems (II) and the systems controlled 
mostly manually (I). Although system II has room for 
larger workloads, its efficiency is not greater than that 
of system I because of fatigue and lack of concentra-
tion, which are manifested when the human is in the 
role of passive process controller.
Technological possibilities of automation of pro-
cesses are used as a way of reducing the need for 
human labour. Thus, savings are achieved by reduc-
ing the number of crew members. This directly im-
plies the second socio-technical principle of domi-
nation, or accelerated development of the technical 
aspect which does not comply with the organizational 
elements and human resources. On the other hand, 
technology has allowed faster exploitation of the ship 
with regard to reducing the time needed for loading 
and discharging of cargo. At the same time, transport 
capacity of ships and average speed of navigation 
are increasing. Thus, by reducing the number of crew 
members the focus shifts to the domain of passive 
control and increased workload due to the faster ship 
exploitation and reduced number of crewmembers. 
Dynamic exploitation of the ship uses the space for 
higher workloads - System II. The result is fatigue in 
the field of applied automation and fatigue in the 
field of workload required to conduct the ship under 
way which is in contrast with the first socio-technical 
principle of human-technology synchrony. An alterna-
tive to changing over from automated to manual con-
trol is an option that is rarely used and also leads to 
passivizing operator which is expressed precisely at 
moments when there is the need of urgent and prior-
ity action. Such bases give rise to the phenomenon 
of technology indulgence, or the impact of technol-
ogy on the move of active knowledge and skills to the 
area of passive ones and, ultimately, those that prove 
inaccessible in emergency situations. This thesis has 
been confirmed by Schuffel in the following conclu-
sion: “Long-term performance of passive control op-
erations reduces the need for traditional knowledge 
and skills resulting in a possible loss of such knowl-
















































Legend: A – automation, M – manual
Figure 4 - Level of automation in the engine room
and on the bridge
Source: Schuffel, H., Some Aspects of the Future Role of
Ergonomics in Ship Control, 1981, p.10
Figure 4 shows that engineers tend to have control 
function while deck officers, besides control function, 
also have the executive function. In this regard it is 
the diversity within control elements such as usabil-
ity, data storage and management that strikes the 
eye. Data storage and management are discussed as 
automated control elements as far as engine is con-
cerned, but not as regards the bridge where there is 
the alternative of manual controls and feedback con-
trol. Previous experience with automated ship control 
systems point to the first socio-technical principle of 
mismatch because of fatigue during the prolonged 
repetition of routine control activities. This occurs be-
cause of an excessive number of automated control 
elements at the compensatory level on the bridge 
and in the engine room that passivizes and some-
times confuses the operator by extensive and vague 
instructions - Integrated navigation systems, ARPA 
radar, electronic chart, GMDSS equipment, and au-















Figure 5 - Effect of human activities and automated
control elements on the system
Source: Schuffel, H., Some Aspects of the Future Role of
Ergonomics in Ship Control, 1981, p. 12
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In relation to the second socio-technical principle 
only the elements of control at the feedback level 
justify the application of automation particularly to 
the processes that assist and support the operator. 
In this sense Rothblum (2000:8)7 suggests: “Human 
error can be significantly reduced by appropriate de-
sign of devices (equipment), work environment and an 
appropriate organization within which the equipment 
and work environment are designed with the basic as-
sumption to support the operator and adapt to their 
abilities and constraints - human-centred design.” At 
the same time, the observed passivization of human 
onboard ship requires his permanent training on the 
same kind of simulation devices on shore on which all 
foreseeable circumstances that may befall him should 
be trained. The imperative to create common stan-
dards of use for certain segments of equipment and 
devices is suggested by itself. In addition to the skills 
obtained through simulation technology the officers 
should continuously improve their current knowledge 
about the devices they operate. A study conducted on 
100 maritime accidents that occurred between 1982 
and 1985 indicate insufficient knowledge in the field 
of usage of devices and equipment that caused 35% 
of accidents considered (Wagenaar, 1987:594).
CONCLUSION
Based on these considerations and research the 
non-compliance of the existing ship organization and 
technology has been observed. According to socio-
technical principles the non-compliance can be si-
multaneously viewed as a mismatch of human and 
technical resources, and a schematic diagram of a 
possible parallel management of socio-technical sys-
tem is proposed as a scheme of optimizing the ship 
organization. In addition, it was found that the ship’s 
organization still tends towards autocratic manage-
ment which is the organizational throwback inherited 
from the traditional hierarchical structure of ship man-
agement. In this sense, the socio-technical theory sup-
ports the elements of teamwork at the group level and 
the principle of responsible autonomy of the team. The 
investigation conducted showed that 75% of respon-
dents indulge to technical solutions and suppress ac-
tive personal knowledge and skills. This leads to pas-
sivity of seamen’s current knowledge and creativity, 
or decrease in satisfaction with maritime profession. 
Consequently, this brings about an increase in human 
error as the backbone of recent maritime accidents. In 
order to reduce the socio-technical mismatch the con-
trol systems have been comparatively observed and it 
was found that only the systems with feedback control 
harmonize the human with the system. Furthermore, 
inconsistencies were found with regard to automated 
systems at the compensatory level, causing mental 
and physical fatigue to the operator. Based on the 
aforementioned, a new conceptual approach has been 
proposed to the design of equipment and work envi-
ronment with the basic requirement of adaptation of 
technology to human abilities and limitations (human-
centred design). Accordingly, the creation of common 
standards of usage of the equipment and devices on 
the bridge and in the engine room has been proposed. 
The standardized equipment would be optimal to train 
seafarers and consistently develop knowledge about 
the devices operated in practice.
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SAŽETAK 
 
SOCIOTEHNIČKI MODEL UČINKOVITOSTI 
ORGANIZACIJE BRODA
Članak istražuje mogućnosti optimalizacije organizacije 
broda kao visoko kompleksnog tehničkog sustava. U tom 
smislu razmatra se postojeći odnos tehnologije i čovjeka kao 
korisnika. Sociotehničkim pristupom nastoje se identificirati 
slabe točke u postojećem tehnološko-organizacijskom sus-
tavu broda. Na osnovi provedenih istraživanja na navigacijs-
kom simulatoru uočene su sociotehničke komponente koje 
ugrožavaju sigurnost plovidbe. Naknadnim komparativnim 
analizama korištenja tehničkih rješenja sukladno potre-
bama čovjeka predložena su određena rješenja i zaključci.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI
sociotehnički model, brodska organizacija, sigurnost, 
učinkovitost, tehnološka podložnost, kontrolni sustavi, au-
tomatizacija
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